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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE, 
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE 
and TONIA PIRTLE, 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
Case No. 15,639 
-vs-
MARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH STRATE, (and THOMAS R.: 
BLONQUIST) 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Sixth Judicial 
District Court of Sanpete County, Judge Don V. Tibbs, presiding, 
which held each of the defendants and their attorney, Thomas R. 
Blonquist, Salt Lake City, Utah, in contempt for violation of 
a certain order of the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendants, and their attorney Thomas R. Blonquist 
(hereafter collectively "defendants"), were found in contempt 
for violating a Court Order dated September 22, 1977. It is 
from that judgment that the defendants appeal. The "Sworn 
Accusation" or complaint against the defendants was ultimately 
dismissed and that order of dismissal is also on appeal by 
the plaintiffs as Case No. 15620. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek a reversal of the judgment of 
contempt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 22, 1977 at the hour of 2:15 p.m., Judge 
David B. Dee signed a "Order to Show Cause and Temporary Res::: 
Order" in Civil No. 7556 in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
Sanpete County, State of Utah. That Order to Show Cause ordt:· 
the defendants to appear in the County Courthouse in Manti, v 
on Wednesday, September 28, and there show cause why a 
preliminary injunction should not issue enjoining the defend' 
from appointing a new superintendent of the North Sanpete 
County School District and why they should not be enjoined 
from "further violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act and the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act." 
The Order further temporarily restrained and enjoined the 
defendants from appointing a new superintendent of the North 
Sanpete County School District and from violating the two 
above cited Acts. 
The Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order 
were apparently based upon a document entitled "sworn Accusa: 
which was subsequently filed with the Clerk of the Sixth 
Judicial District in Sanpete County at 5 P.M. on September 
22, 1977. (R.l.) At the time the "Sworn Accusation" was 
originally filed, there was only one plaintiff, Patricia 
Mellor, and the Sworn Accusation claimed that it was a 
removal action to remove the defendants from their offices 
on the Board of Education of the North Sanpete County schO' 
2 
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District pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 77-7-1, et.seq. 
The sequence of events surrounding the obtaining of the 
Temporary Restraining Order and the filing of the Sworn 
Accusation are as follows: 
The three defendants, Cook, Madsen and Strate had been 
duly elected as members of the Board of North Sanpete County 
School District and were functioning in that capacity in the 
Spring of 1977. In June and July of 1977, the Board decided 
to remove Royal N. Allred as superintendent of schools in 
that area and to replace him with another. The Board solicited 
applications from various individuals which resulted in the 
setting of a meeting for September 22, 1977 at which time 
the Board.was to consider final applicants for the superintendent 
position. A~small but vocal group of local citizens had 
,, 
7 
opposed the actions of the school board and the consternation 
of this group apparently culminated in the decision to 
institute removal proceedings against the three defendants. 
Patricia Mellor, an alleged taxpayer in Sanpete County, was 
apparently chosen as the figurehead for the movement and to 
represent this group as the plaintiff. Apparently the group 
decided on September 22, 1977 that they would have to take 
some action to attempt to stop the meeting scheduled for 
that evening. It appears that the attorneys for the plaintiff 
called for Judge Don v. Tibbs in Sanpete County but discovered 
that he was conducting a trial in Vernal, Utah and would be 
unable to hear a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 
(R. 37-38) . It is assumed that attorneys for the plaintiff 
were going to go to Manti, file the "Sworn Accusation" 
3 
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and then have the judge hear the motion for the Restraining 
Order. The attorneys contacted Judge Tibbs in Vernal, who 
then called the Court Administrator for the State of Utah 
in Salt Lake City and asked the administrator to assign a 
judge in the Third Judicial District to hear the motion for 
the Temporary Restraining Order. (R.38, 56). The administr, 
called Judge Peter Leary, presiding judge of the Third 
Judicial District who suggested that Judge David Dee, assig:1c 
to the Law and Motion Calendar of the Third Judicial Distric: 
should be asked to hear the Motion. Whereupon, the assistar: 
court administrator, Ronald W. Goodson, assigned Judge Dee 
to hear the Motion. In a subsequent affidavit, the adminis'.:1 
claimed authority pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-3-24 for making the assignment (R.57). 
The motion of the plaintiff was heard on the afternoon 
of June 22, 1977 and at 2:15 p.m., Judge Dee signed the 
Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order. (R.20). 
Since no pleadings had been filed in Sanpete County prior tc 
the time that Judge Dee signed the Order, the attorneys for 
the plaintiff, immediately after obtaining the Judge's 
signature on the Order, called Mrs. Wanda Bartholomew Depur 
Clerk of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete Count] 
and informed her that an attorney was leaving from Salt Lai:' 
City for Manti and that he would be in Manti at approximate 
5:00 p.m. to file the papers. The Attorney requested~~ 
Mrs. Bartholomew stay a few minutes after 5:00 p.m. in the 
event that he was unable to arrive exactly at 5: 00 and Llic 
4 
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attorney also informed her that it was important that the 
papers be filed on September 22. (R.31-32). The attorneys 
arrived at 4:58 p.m. and commenced filing the papers and 
Mrs. Bartholomew stamped the Sworn Accusation as being filed 
on September 22, at 5:00 P.M. (R.l, R.31}. The attorneys 
·also had Mrs. Bartholomew issue the Temporary Restraining 
Order and Order to Show Cause. 
The Sworn Accusation, along with a summons and the 
Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order were 
then delivered to the Sheriff who served them on each of the 
three defendants at approximately 6:00 p.m., as they arrived at 
the scheduled meeting that evening. 
In the meantime, Mr. Thomas R. Blonquist, an attorney 
in Salt Lake City who had been retained by the North Sanpete 
County School Board, had been contacted by Mr. Bruce J. 
Nelson, attorney for.the plaintiff on the late afternoon of 
September 22, 1977 and had been informed by Mr. Nelson that 
the Temporary Restraining Order had been signed. Mr. Blonquist 
was on his way to the meeting in Sanpete County and arrived 
in Sanpete County after the meeting had already commenced. 
At the time of arrival of Mr. Blonquist, the Board was already 
in a closed meeting where the Order to Show Cause and Temporary 
Restraining Order were being discussed. Mr. Blonquist at 
that time advised the members of the Board that in his 
opinion the Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show 
Cause was improperly issued and that the Board could proceed 
to hire a new superintendent on that evening. Subsequently, 
5 
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the Board did in fact vote to hire a new superintendent at 
the meeting of September 22, 1977. lR. 38-39). 
On September 26, 1977, the plaintiff obtained an Order 
to Show Cause signed by Judge Don V. Tibbs ordering the 
defendants and Thomas R. Blonquist to appear before him on 
September 28, at the hour of 10: 00 a.m. and show cause why 
they should not be held in contempt for disobeying the 
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause issued 
on September 22 by Judge Dee. (R. 36) . Pursuant to request 
of both counsel, the matter was continued to Friday, Septemte 
30, 1977 for hearing on the contempt issue. 
Both parties filed Memoranda and Affidavits in Support 
of their respective positions prior to September 30, 1977, 
and in addition, Mr. Blonquist (since he was also the subjec 
of the Order to Show Cause), employed Robert C. Fillerup as 
his counsel. The testimony at the hearing showed the follow; 
1. The Sworn Accusation was signed by the plaintiff o: 
the afternoon of September 22, 1977. (R. 224). 
2. Judge David Dee signed the Order at approximately 
2:15 p.m. in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. At approximately 2: 30 p .m., a copy of the Restrairi; 
Order along with the Sworn Accusation, Order to Show cause 
and Motion for Order to Show Cause were delivered to Mr. 
Blonquist at his office in Salt Lake City by Mr. Bruce 
Nelson. (R. 230-232). 
4. Enroute to the regularly scheduled meeting, Mr. 
Blonquist stopped and called the Clerk of Sanpete Connt)'' 
6 
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approximately 4:30 p.m. and asked if the Sworn Accusation 
had been filed. He was told that the Sworn Accusation had 
not been filed but that the Clerk had been requested to stay 
until 5:00 p.m. so that the documents could be filed that 
afternoon. (R.232). 
5. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Mr. Blonquist again 
called the Clerk and was told that there were representatives 
of the plaintiff there at that time filing the papers. 
(R.234). Mr. Blonquist requested that the clerk note not 
only the date but the time that the papers were being filed 
(R.236), which notation appears on the Sworn Accusation and 
the accompanying Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 
(R. l, 13). 
6. ~r. Blonquist arrived at the School Board meeting 
on the evening of September 22 after the Board had entered 
into "closed session". (R.237). At that time Mr. Blonquist 
was asked concerning the Restraining Order and he advised 
the Board that based upon his knowledge of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the information that he had received 
from Mrs. Bartholomew, it was his opinion that Judge Dee did 
not have any jurisdiction over the matter at 2:15 p.rn. that 
afternoon, that in his opinion the Court Order was void, 
having been signed prior to the time that the action was 
commenced. (R.237). He advised the Board in addition that 
they could appoint a Superintendent even though the Order 
had been served upon them prior to the Board Meeting. (R. 237) • 
7. Based upon the advice of Mr. Blonquist, the Board 
7 
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voted in closed session 5 to 0, to hi re a new superintendent 
and in open session voted 3 to 2 to hire a new superintenden: 
(R. 252-2 53) . 
8. At the meeting the Board in fact hired Mr. Lloyd 
Smith as the new superintendent of the School Board. (R.253). 
9. The School Board had been acting without a superint,, 
from August 29, 1977 to September 22, 1977. (R.265-268). 
10. Each of the defendants testified that they would 
not have taken the action to vote for a new superintendent 
but for the advice of Mr. Blonquist. 
In its Order of Contempt, the Court made the following 
findings: that the Judge (Tibbsl was out of the District on 
September 22, that he was notified by telephone of an inunedi; 
need for a Hearing, that in conformity with the rules and 
the laws, he contacted the Court Administrator's office for 
the purpose of obtaining another Judge to sit in his pla~ 
for the hearing of the Motion, that Judge Dee was assigned 
and heard a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, which 
was executed in Salt Lake City at 2:15 p.m. September 22. 
The Court further found that the Sworn Accusation and other 
documents were filed in the Sanpete County Clerk's office o: 
September 22 at 5: 00 p .m. and that they were served upon al 
three defendants personally on September 22, at 6: 00 p.m. 
inforrc; 1 The Court also found that Mr. Blonquist had personal 
and knowledge of the Order' at the time that he appeared at 
the School Board meeting and the Court found that all the 
defendants and ~r. Blonquist had knowledge of the Court 
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order prior to the meeting of the School Board. 
The Court found each of the defendants in contempt for 
violating the Order on the basis that the question of the 
legality of the order should have been brought before the 
court upon application of counsel and that Hr. Blonquist 
should not have taken upon himself to instruct anyone to 
disobey the order. The Court also found that this case had 
received wide publicity to the point that the public needed 
to be advised that when the Court issued an Order, it had to 
be obeyed until it was set aside by further order of the 
Court. (R.293, 294). 
The Court reserved the question of the amount of attorneys 
fees for further hearing, which hearing was held on November 
30, 1977. (R. 173). At that time, the Court ordered that 
defendants pay to plaintiff the sum of $1,000 as attorneys 
fees for obtaining a contempt citation. The final findings, 
conclusion and order were entered by the Court on December 
12, 1977. (R. 177-180). 
Defendants submit that the lower Court erred in 
finding contempt in the present circumstance. 
9 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFENDANTS 
IN CONTEMPT. 
The basis upon which a court can find contempt is 
set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 78-32-1. The relevant 
portions of that section are as follows: 
"Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect 
to a Court or proceedings that are in con-
tempts of the authority of the Court: 
* * * (5) disobedience of any lawful, judgment, 
order or process of the Court. (emphasis 
added) . 
The judgment, order, or process of the Court must be 
lawful before a defendant can be in contempt for its 
violation. 
The lawfulness of a contempt order is determined by 
whether the issuing court had jurisdiction, Whillock v. 
Whillock, 550 P. 2d 558 (Okl. 1976); and if an alleged conte~: 
can show that the act complained of as contemptuous is the 
claimed violation of an order of a court which was without 
jurisdiction, he may not be held in contempt, Phoenix News_M: 
Inc., v. Superior Court In and for Maricopa County, 101 
Arix. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966). Additionally, violation of 
an order patently in excess of the jurisdiction of the 
issuing Court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt, 
State Ex Rel. Superior Ct. of Snohomish Co., v. Sperry, 79 
Wash. 2d 69, 483 P. 2d 608 (1971). And finally, as stated i~ 
10 
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In Re Berry, .65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273 at 280; 
"In this state it is clearly the law that 
the violation of an order in excess of the 
jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot 
produce a valid judgment of contempt 
(Fortenbury v. Superior Court (_1940) 16 Cal. 
2d 405, 407-408, 106 P.2d 411; Brady v. 
Superior Court (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 
73, 19 Cal.Rptr. 242; Grant v. Superior 
Court (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 15, 19-20, 29 
Cal.Rptr. 125; l Witkin, Cal. Procedure, 
§ 155, pp. 421-422), and that the "jurisdiction" 
in question extends beyond mere subject matter 
or personal jurisdiction to that concept de-
scribed by us in Abelleira v. District Court 
of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, at page 291, 109 
P.2d 942, at page 948, 132 A.L.R. 715: 
"Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the 
defined power of a court in any instance, whether 
that power be defined by constitutional 
provision, express statutory declaration, or 
rules developed by the courts and followed 
under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in 
excess of jurisdiction." 
These rules were acknowledged by this Court some time 
ago in the case of In Re Rogers' Estate, 75 Utah 290, 284 
P.992 (1930) ,wherein the Court was faced with deciding 
whether the failure of an administratrix of an estate to 
execute a deed in accordance with an order of a probate 
court was contemptuous. This Court found that the probate 
court had exceeded its jurisdiction in quieting title in a 
stranger to the probate proceedings and directing a deed to 
be given to the stranger; 
Under such circumstances the Probate Court 
was without jurisdiction to direct Katie S. 
Rogers to execute a deed to Cornelius West. 
To invoke the jurisdiction of a court there 
must be appropriate pleadings. Hampshire 
v. Wooley (Utah) 269 P.135; Rolando v. 
District Court (Utah) 271 P.225. The Order 
11 
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adjudging Katie S. Rogers guilty of contempt 
is based upon the judgment directing her to 
execute a deed to Cornelius West. A failure 
to comply with a void judgment is not contempt. 
284 P. at 997. (Emphasis added}. 
In the present case, Judge Dee had no authority to 
issue the Temporary Restraining Order for several reasons; 
FIRST, the Court did not have jurisdiction as required 
by Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 
rule states as follows: 
"(c) Time of Jurisdiction. The Court shall have 
jurisdiction from the time of filing the 
Complaint or the service of the surrunons." 
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, a Court in this state 
cannot acquire jurisdiction prior to the filing of a Compla: 
or the service of a sum.~ons. 
The word "filing" as used in Rule 3 (c), relates back t: 
Rule 3 (a) which describes the manner of commencing a civil 
action. As therein defined, a civil action may be corrunencE 
as follows: 
"(a) How commenced. A civil action is 
commenced (1) by filing a Complaint with 
the Court, or (2) by the service of a 
summons. 
According to the preceding rules, a Court neither 
acquires jurisdiction nor is the action commenced until 
either the Complaint is filed or a summons is served. 
Rule 5 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure definE 
filing with the Court as follows: 
12 b 
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"The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the Court as required by these rules 
shall be made by filing them with the clerk 
of the Court, except that the judge may 
permit the papers to be filed with him, in 
which event he shall note thereon the filing 
date and forthwith transmit them to the office 
of the Clerk, if any." 
In the present case, the papers were clearly not filed 
with Judge Dee since there is no notation upon the papers. 
In addition, he did not transmit them to the office of the 
Clerk. In fact, the plaintiff must not have felt that she 
had filed the papers with Judge Dee or she would not have 
had her attorney call the clerk in Sanpete County and ask 
her to wait while they traveled to Sanpete County to file 
the papers. Until the Complaint in the instant action had 
been delivered into the hands of the Clerk of the Sanpete 
County Court, there was no filing. Since the Court can 
only "have jurisdiction from the time of the filing of the 
complaint," Judge Dee lacked jurisdiction at the time he 
signed the Order. 
SECONDLY, Judge Dee, in particular, was without authority 
to hear the motion for temporary restraining order. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3-13 indicates when 
judges may hold court in another county. 
"Judge may hold Court in any county on request -
Any district judge may hold a district court 
in any county at the request of the judge of 
the district or of the presiding district judge, 
and upon the request of the governor or the 
court administrator it shall be his duty to do 
so; and the judge holding the court shall have 
the same powers as the judge thereof." 
13 
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Ti1is general rule allowing judges to preside anywhere 
in the state is restricted, however, by the very next 
sectio· 
Utah Code Annotated 78-3-14 which defines when judges from 
another district may hear Ex parte applications. 
"78-3-14. Ex parte applications from another 
district A judge of the district may, in 
his own district, hear any ex parte application 
and make any order concerning the same, in ' 
any action or proceeding pending or about to 
be commenced in another judicial district, in 
the following cases: 
(1) Upon the written request of the judge 
of the district in which the action or proceeding 
is at the time pending or is about to be commenced, 
(2) When it shall be made to appear _l:'.y 
affidavit to the satisfaction of such judge 
that the judge of the district court in which the 
action or proceeding is at the time pending or 
is about to be commenced is absent from his 
district, or is incapacitated, or is disqualified 
to act therein; such application shall be made 1 
only to the judge of the adjoining district." 
(emphasis added). 
The foregoing statute makes it clear that a judge outsic 
the district in which an action is pending or about to be 
commenced can hear ex parte applications only under two 
circumstances. First, upon the written request of the judge 
of the district in which the action is pending or, by an 
affidavit showing that the judge is either out of the distrii 
incapacitated, etc. That application however, can only berna: 
to the judge of an adjoining district. The Third District c: 
is clearly not adjoining to the Sixth District Court and 
so subsection (2) is inapplicable. 
Since this was an ex parte proceeding, it required Jud~: 
Tibbs to make a written request that a judge of the Third 
District be assigned. There was no such written request~ 
14 I 
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the present case. 
While Utah Code Annotated, §78-3-24 gives certain 
powers to the administrator of the Courts, those powers 
are clearly limited by Utah Code Annotated §78-3-14. 
The court administrator certainly has no power to set 
aside the clear requirements of that statute. 
An analysis of the statutes cited oblige the conclusion 
that Judge Dee was without authority to hear the motion. 
F.inally, the defendants had not been served with any 
process of any manner prior to the time the order was entered. 
Without that service, the defendants could not be subject to 
any order of the court. 
The trial court's finding that any problem with the 
time and manner of filing the order "was corrected upon the 
moment of filing the sworn accusation which was 5:00 o'clock 
in the afternoon," is clearly erroneous. A lack of jurisdiction 
over the person at the time of entry of an order or judgment 
cannot be corrected by the subsequent acquisition of proper 
jurisdiction. "The general rule is that a judgment which is 
void cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings." 46 Am. Jur. 2d, 
349, Judgments, §50. 
Since "Acquisition of Jurisdiction over the person 
of the defendant generally depends on whether service of 
process has been made in the manner required by law," 
20 luH. Jur. 2d, 491, courts §143, there could have been 
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no jurisdiction of the Court over the individual defend"" I 
at the time of the entry of the order by Judge Dee, 'I 
notwithstanding the fact that the Court subsequently acquirea\ 
jurisdiction. Consequently, an order entered without such 
jurisdiction is in violation of Constitutional due process 
requirements and is not merely voidable but is void. 46~ 
Jur. 2d 330, Judgments, §25. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants should not have been adjudged contemnors 
for violating an Order which was void for want of 
jurisdiction. To punish defendants for the failure of 
the plaintiff to properly proceed was manifestly erroneous. 
The Judgment of Contempt should be reserved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Y!AILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Defendants-
Appellants to: Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl Jay Peck, and Bruce 
J. Nelson of the firm of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & 
Peck, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 410 Newhouse 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this f-f/- day of 
-g--+f-'~"-------' 1978. 
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